| Translation of Russian political analyst Alexey | | | | narrow-minded anachronism.Russian politicians still |
| Pushkov's article of the same name.Handing over | | | | argue which party to pattern our economy and policy |
| power to Vladimir Putin in 1999, Boris Yeltsin sought | | | | on - Europe or the USA. Oh, but we must pattern |
| to preserve the political alignment of forces and | | | | them on Russia, the total of its interests! Checking |
| coordinates he set during his rule in Russia in | | | | our interests with those of other counrties, of |
| 1991-1999. The project 'Heir' did not only imply | | | | course.Sixth. Under Putin the country's controllability |
| selecting a man from Yeltsin's 'camp', but the one | | | | was restored, its slow desintegration was stopped. |
| who would preserve the status quo of the regime. | | | | When Yeltsin was in office the national republics fell |
| This is indicated, among other things, by the fact | | | | off the Union, break-away sentiments appeared in |
| that he insisted on his 'key men' Alexey Voloshin and | | | | the Chechen, Tartar and other autonomous republics, |
| Mikhail Kasyanov to have the longest possible term in | | | | even certain Russian regions began to claim |
| office.However, the overall results of Putin's five-year | | | | autonomy (let us remember the Urals Republic |
| office show that he has discarded most of Yeltsin's | | | | proposed by the Urals governor Eduard Rossel). This |
| heritage.First of all, he bridged the basic gap of | | | | process was slow, but it endangered the country's |
| Yeltsin's epoch, the gap between the left and the | | | | integrity. Meanwhile Yeltsin took the 'gulp as much |
| right wings. Under Yeltsin, there was a continuous | | | | sovereignty as you can' stance.Zbignev Bzhezinsky, a |
| struggle between the authority, on the one hand, | | | | well-known American political scientist, published a |
| and the communists, patriots and socialist-oriented | | | | map where Russia was divided into three countries: |
| part of the population, on the other. The country | | | | European, Siberian and Far Eastern. That was his |
| was fevered by constant strife; the State Duma, | | | | tentative project for Russia. Yes, there was a |
| where the communists had majority, being in the | | | | possibility of such an outcome - take the town of |
| vanguard of struggle with Yeltsin and the elite, could | | | | Khasavyurt in Dagestan, a part of Russia that was |
| not carry out the legislative process, as their laws did | | | | given 5 years' independence. The danger of |
| not suit the executive and were virtually directed | | | | disintegration is still looming, although the Center is |
| against the latter.Putin neutralised the left, adopting | | | | keen on consolidating the country. Putin lifted the |
| much of their arguments: Russia does have the acute | | | | national morale and showed that separatism will not |
| demographic problem (the low birth- and high | | | | go unpunished. He should beware, though, putting too |
| death-rates), the oligarchy dominance, corruption and | | | | much pressure on the national republics and divesting |
| weak army. These points were taken upon by Putin | | | | them of their rights, as it may cause an outburst of |
| in his election program, at least as a rhetoric (in the | | | | nationalism.Seventh. Despite all the drawbacks of the |
| part of olgarchy limitations and army financing they | | | | present government, V. Putin was able to win back |
| were put into actual practice). Then, Putin broke the | | | | people's trust for public authority. There is no trace |
| Communists' 'monopoly' on patriotism, thus rendering | | | | of 'devilry around the throne', so glaring in Yeltsin's |
| their traditional 'anti-people's regime' rant | | | | time and headed by Boris Berezovsky. Even the |
| meaningless.Communists are now heard only when | | | | liberal journalists, who criticise, sometimes |
| the authority initiates rash, unprepared and | | | | unreservedly, the present government, admit that |
| ill-grounded laws, like the monetisation of perquisites | | | | there was a mafia-like 'family clan' around Yeltsin, |
| for pensioners - the measure, which was not enough | | | | which held power in the country. True, there are |
| elucidated in the press.Secondly, the President was | | | | various factions and influential groups, promoting their |
| able to revamp the pattern of power and unite the | | | | interests and struggling with each other in today's |
| elite. Putin assigned the issues of economy to liberal | | | | administration, but none of these claim to have entire |
| democrats, those of security - to the military and law | | | | power, to be the only decision-makers.Some people |
| enforcement, and entrusted the administrators who | | | | say V. Putin's team is not united. Yes, there are |
| succeeded in retaining power in later Yeltsin's | | | | controversies in it. But, on the other hand, there is no |
| weakened hands with domestic policy. These are all | | | | 'family' either. St. Petersburg's representatives were |
| very different people representing differents parts of | | | | at first considered more 'close' to the President than |
| the elite, but to a certain extent united under | | | | others, but it was not born out, say, Dmitry Kozak, |
| Putin.Why did the Union of the Right Forces (the | | | | was dispatched to the Southern Federal District as |
| SPS) lose the recent election? Because it was no | | | | the President's plenipotentiary to deal with the |
| longer indispensable: many government officers, such | | | | Chechen Republic and terrorism. Under V. Putin the |
| as German Gref, Alexey Kudrin, Igor Shuvalov pursue | | | | 'office politics' (the code of relations between |
| the rightist policy as it is. The perquisites | | | | officials) became fundamentally different - |
| monetisation, drafting the hyperliberal Forest Code, | | | | meritocracy was established.However, there are |
| cancellation of State Standards for pharmaceutical | | | | serious problems ahead for Putin. He 'steered the ship |
| products and even motioning prison privatisation are | | | | about, but has not set a well-defined course for her'. |
| the telltale signs of the liberal course in Russia's | | | | First. The economy grows largely due to the oil price |
| domestic policy (whether these measures are for the | | | | rise. Russia hasn't begun forming a competitive |
| good or for the bad is another matter).V. Putin has in | | | | economy - developing high technologies, launching |
| his arsenal not only the leftist, but also the rightist | | | | large-scale target programs, renovating the defense |
| ideas. It is not accidental that Anatoly Chubais tried | | | | establishments, etc. All these could only be attained |
| to throw in the catchphrase 'a liberal empire' to define | | | | with the participation of the state, but it left the |
| the present political system in Russia - the SPS was | | | | economy to its devices. The positive dynamics of |
| losing its 'property right' for liberal reforms. | | | | Russia's economy won't keep, if the oil prices |
| Neutralisation of the right wing is the third | | | | drop.The economy remains passive: it absorbs |
| accomplishment of Putin's office.Fourth. Putin was | | | | enormous sums of money and yields 6-7 percent |
| able to considerably weaken the influence of big | | | | growth, but Russia keeps selling its staple raw |
| business on the State machinery and policy. Mikhail | | | | materials and does not work up new foreign |
| Khodorkovsky made an attempt of directly | | | | markets. There is no growth in mechanical engineering |
| converting money into power, like at a bureau de | | | | exports, nor in high tech production. However, the |
| change - he offered 15 billion roubles for power in | | | | competitive strength of an economy is determined |
| Russia. His plan was frustrated by Putin. Some people | | | | by these two factors, and not by raw materials, but |
| say, it is not democratic. But did Khodorkovsky act in | | | | by finished goods. So far Russia's economy has not |
| a democratic way? How were the 15 billion rubles | | | | been set for efficiency, no innovative breakthrough |
| obtained? In general terms, does big money entitle a | | | | has been made.Second. The situation in Chechnya is |
| person to power purchase? The history of Russian | | | | much more serious than it may seem, and the |
| oligarchy is essentially about converting money into | | | | Chechen leader Ahmad Kadyrov's assassination is a |
| power. Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky were | | | | heavy blow to the peace in this region. Though there |
| doing it through mass media, for example, when in | | | | is no war in the classic sense there, as separatists |
| 1996 Gusinsky helped Yeltsin win the elections | | | | have no power to 'fight on fronts', Chechnya is |
| enlisting the services of the establishment-sponsored | | | | pervaded with separatist and terrorist agents. Raids |
| television channel NTV, it was the direct conversion | | | | and acts of terrorism still obtain in the region, and |
| of a media resource into power.Earlier in 1994 | | | | even spread to the country at large.Third. Vladimir |
| Alexander Korzhakov, the then Chief of the | | | | Putin has not yet created an efficient state machine. |
| President's Security Service, conducted - by Yeltsin's | | | | For example, the events in Beslan on September 1-3 |
| instructions - the 'mug in snow' operation against | | | | 2004, when more than 4,000 children and teachers |
| Gusinsky, so that the oligarchs could understand that | | | | were held hostage, prove the low efficacy of |
| authority should not be conflicted with, but paid off | | | | security service. Under B.Yeltsin the KGB was being |
| (not necessarily with direct finance). So the oligarchs | | | | consistently wrecked under pretence of fighting |
| began to finance media to brainwash people by | | | | communism (the consequences of this act are not |
| meting out, distorting information, misinforming, | | | | yet fully overcome). Yet not one democratic state |
| launching media attacks as a punishment for public | | | | could manage without strong security services, what |
| figures, orchestrating public opinion, spin control and | | | | was really needed is to reform the former Soviet |
| fixing elections... For such services Berezovsky even | | | | intelligence.Fourth. Russia should vindicate its positions |
| obtained an office in the government - he became | | | | in foreign policy with more firmness. American |
| deputy secretary of the Security Council and was | | | | politicians spoke to me (Alexey Pushkov) about the |
| responsible for the Chechen issues (a glaring | | | | surprise Russia's refusal to back the war in Iraq |
| absurdity from today's perspective!).Berezovsky and | | | | caused with the US administration. Why did Russia |
| Gusinsky believed that Yeltsin's apointee Vladimir | | | | give an impression that it could be counted on in any |
| Putin would let them play their games as before. | | | | matter, or that it shouldn't be reckoned with? |
| They were baulked in their plans. However, certain | | | | Because it had settled for anything the USA was |
| agressive representatives of big business persisted in | | | | doing, be it the withdrawal from the Anti-Missile |
| their struggle for power - the inertia of complete | | | | Defence Treaty (the Russian government's comment: |
| license was too strong, the sense of omnipotence | | | | 'a deplorable error') or the second round of the |
| struck root. 'We would beat Yeltsin all the same - | | | | NATO expansion. The US administration |
| while he had been learning to play domino, we had | | | | overestimated its influence on Moscow, but it was |
| mastered chess', said Leonid Nevzlin, a businessman | | | | Russia who gave cause for this, adopting a policy too |
| and public relations expert. Mikhail Khodorkovsky's | | | | 'comfortable' for the USA.Unfortunately, many |
| logic was of the same strain: the sense of | | | | features of Yeltsin's administration devolved on that |
| exclusiveness prompted him to attempt to use | | | | of Putin. The lack of publicity in legislature is one of |
| financial clout and gain control over the State Duma | | | | them. We are faced with political reforms, which |
| and the Federation Council, thus becoming the 'power | | | | come as if out of the blue - nobody has taken the |
| broker', de facto leader of the country. That splendid | | | | trouble to explain their essence and prove their |
| coup was thwarted - Putin's government wouldn't | | | | necessity. This is said to be the traditional Russian |
| play either domino or chess with Khodorkovsky, it | | | | authoritarian style of administration. But bad traditions |
| simply upturned the table. Some say it wasn't nice or | | | | should be changed, unless the government is willing |
| fair. Perhaps. But it was not fair play on the part of | | | | to stand aloof from its people.The main dangers |
| Khodorkovsky in the first place.Khodorkovsky's | | | | impending over Putin's administration are as |
| political failure as the failure of converting money into | | | | follows.The first is the situation in Chechnya. The |
| power was logical. Yeltsin depended on the oligarchs, | | | | efficiency of Putin's policy largely depends on his |
| as he had no other 'point of rest', being politically and | | | | ability to settle the Chechen conflict. If the 'vertical of |
| physically infirm, unpopular, and undergoing persistent | | | | power' built by him does not yield fruit in that region, |
| pressure from the left wing. Contrariwise, Putin is | | | | he will fail to convince the country in the necessity of |
| popular; he succeeded in uniting the elite and was | | | | exerting control. It is precisely the issue of Chechnya |
| able to move away from the oligarchs.Some political | | | | that will be the touchstone of Putin's policy, both in |
| scientists maintain that the restriction of big business | | | | Russia and internationally. The Chechen war and |
| power is wrong, as it entails the omnipotent power | | | | terror became Putin's gravest challenges, which |
| of State bureaucracy. True, the official powers | | | | demand the consolidation of power, strengthening of |
| should be counterbalanced, otherwise the State | | | | the State, and in some cases, turning the screw. But |
| becomes overpowering (this was Russia's permanent | | | | if the screws are tight, and the vehicle does not |
| political bane, but the country needed it because of | | | | move, the question of the adequacy of such a policy |
| its size, climate and a number of other factors). But | | | | will arise.The second danger (more prominent during |
| Yeltsin's immoral big business is not the kind of | | | | his second term in office) is the appearance of |
| counterbalance the community needs. While Russia | | | | consolidated opposition. It includes the liberal politicians |
| was historically better off unter total power, the | | | | who lost the election in the Duma, but have a solid |
| oligarchs would retain it, but make it inhuman and | | | | support of big business, their own financial resources, |
| anti-national - even more unscrupulous, mercenary | | | | and a substantial backing from abroad. They are |
| and corrupt. State totalitarianism would turn into | | | | eager to score political points using the government's |
| oligarchal totalitarianism. There was but imitation of | | | | mistakes. For example, against the logic of their liberal |
| democracy under Yeltsin, but if Khodorkovsky could | | | | market views, they are attacking the monetisation of |
| have gained power, the political pseudodemocracy | | | | perquisites for pensioners. They are doing it, because |
| might have turned into oligarchal pseudodemocracy, | | | | the authority is vulnerable in this poorely prepared |
| with its arsenal of manupulative and venal media. The | | | | reform. The next power standing in opposition to |
| restriction of oligarchal influence on the policy and | | | | Putin is the 'exiled' oligarchs. Berezovsky, Gusinsky, |
| strategy of the State is necessary. Giving a resolute | | | | Nevzlin are people with resources, and have |
| check to Khodorkovsky's plans, Putin made him | | | | connections in the West. Berezovsky is quite frank in |
| understand that individuals (even very rich ones) | | | | saying that his principal goal is to weaken Putin's |
| cannot dictate the policy to the State.Fifth. Putin | | | | regime. Then, the government is opposed by certain |
| proclaimed the foreign policy based on national | | | | liberal media (which include several central TV |
| priorities. Under Yeltsin it was based on absolutely | | | | channels of Russia), especially their aggressive part |
| different principles: the first postulate was that Russia | | | | backed by the oppositional big business. A part of |
| should at all costs become the part of civilised world, | | | | national and regional elite, displeased at the decision |
| implying the West; the second was that Russia has | | | | that regional governors be appointed by the |
| no national interests basically different from those of | | | | President (and apprehending the restoration of the |
| the USA; the third was that Russia should completely | | | | unitarian state), may also join the opposition. A part |
| reject the use of force in solving its political problems, | | | | of liberal intelligentsia and the communists joining the |
| as it is 'undemocratic'.Over the past 10 years we | | | | liberals on certain points also swing against the |
| have seen other nations solve their problems by | | | | administration. Finally, the anti-Russian and anti-Putin |
| various methods, including, alas, the use of force as, | | | | forces in the West are also opposed to Putin. All the |
| for instance, in Bosnia or in Iraq.We also realised, that | | | | mentioned forces are, however, largely outnumbered |
| the course of equating Russia's political interests with | | | | by Putin's supporters (in Russia the ratio is about one |
| those of US or EU is not absolutely correct. Putin | | | | to ten). Nevertheless, they should be reckoned |
| agreed with the USA in the crucial issue of fighting | | | | with.Putin has few propagandists of his ideas and |
| terrorism, but he made it clear that our countries' | | | | proposals. He himself has to explain his home and |
| views on some other issues differ. He is not afraid to | | | | foreign policy, the ideas of his political reforms. His |
| say that Russia has inherent interests in the countries | | | | press secretaries and information services keep |
| of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), | | | | silence, although it is their duty to compete with the |
| even if it may annoy some political parties abroad. | | | | huge bulk of anti-Putin propaganda. The system lacks |
| However, the practical realisation of Russia's national | | | | people with active ideological and political thinking, |
| interests may be impeded by two factors: the | | | | capable of supporting its plans and decisions. And this |
| cosmopolitan character of big business and the | | | | is in the face of strong opposition, nostalgic for |
| 'anational' mentality of the younger generation of | | | | Yeltsin's Russia - weak, docile, corrupt, and |
| Russians, formed during the past 10 years.'Paying | | | | disintegrating.However, if the efficiency of |
| taxes is our only duty, and we owe nobody but God | | | | administration rises, the economy grows, the |
| and our conscience', Peter Aven, a business and | | | | opposition will have to bear Putin's 'authoritarian |
| media tycoon, said in his interview. Yes, but if an | | | | liberalism'. Conversely, if there are no tangible results, |
| individual knows neither God nor conscience? Why | | | | he will be accused of sacrificing democracy. Putin |
| should big business detach itself from the rest of the | | | | must prove that his model is efficient.The period of |
| nation? Russia's big business is essentially | | | | authoritarian development is inevitable. The liberals |
| cosmopolitan, not to say anti-national.As for the | | | | condemn Putin's policy as restoration, but restoration |
| 'anational' mentality, it becomes apparent from the | | | | is a normal practice for any country after a sharp |
| fact that younger people, even those whose major | | | | 'side slip'. If a nation loses capacity for correcting its |
| at universities is political science, sometimes question | | | | 'side slips', it may, like a car, roll over at a sharp turn |
| the necessity of Russia's 'special attutude' towards | | | | of history. Restoration is the nation's adaptation to |
| certain issues. 'Why don't we just trim ourselves to | | | | new conditions, its self-regulation, aligning a car after |
| the US position?', they ask. The notion of 'national | | | | a drastic side slip. |
| interests', as well as patriotism, has been decried as | | | | |